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The Citizens Health Prescription
People have to make terrible choices about whether they’re going to take the drugs their
doctor gave them, put food on the table, or turn the heat up. It’s a very serious problem.1
—Joseph P. Kennedy II
The United States has some of the most important ground-breaking pharmaceuti-cal research in the world. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, great
strides made in the development of new prescription drugs and treatments have
wiped out diseases and greatly enhanced the quality of life for Americans, particu-
larly its senior citizens. As a result, Americans are living longer and healthier lives.
But there is a downside to the important progress that has been made in this area
of healthcare in the United States. Since there are now more prescription drugs on
the market, many of which are more effective than older remedies, demand for them
has increased significantly, driving up both cost and use. Consequently, the United
States has the highest prescription drug prices in the world.2  In the year 2000,
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Prescription drug prices have climbed to unaffordable levels in recent years, creating
a serious public policy problem for lawmakers at both the state and federal levels.
The U.S. Medicare program only covers the costs of inpatient prescription drugs, and
only seventy-five percent of beneficiaries are receiving coverage through some other
means. But because of the tremendous power of the pharmaceutical industry on
Capitol Hill, lawmakers in Washington have been unable to agree upon a workable
solution. As a result, many states are experimenting with different strategies to pro-
vide some relief.
     Massachusetts has attempted to solve the problem through the Prescription
Advantage Program, a first-in-the-nation insurance model that is open to all seniors
in the state. While few would disagree that the program is an effective, inexpensive
option for seniors to access sufficient prescription drug coverage, many have argued
that the state needs to do more to reduce its overall drug costs. After spending two
years lobbying the state to implement one cost-lowering option — a bulk-purchasing
strategy to lower the state’s drug spending, former Congressman Joseph P. Kennedy
II set out to run his own privately run drug discount program, Citizens Health.
     This study finds that there are lessons to be learned from both Citizens Health and
the state’s program, Prescription Advantage. While Prescription Advantage can serve
as a model for a government-sponsored prescription drug plan for seniors, Citizen
Health can provide insight into how to reach other segments of the population who
can’t afford the drugs they need.
Shannon Cadres is a 2002 graduate of the MSPA program of the McCormack Institute at the
University of Massachusetts Boston.  She is currently the public relations director at the Mas-
sachusetts State Lottery Commission.
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pharmaceutical spending in the United States topped $132 billion, an increase of 19
percent over 1999.3
The repercussions of these staggering drug costs are being felt by many. Having
watched the costs of their employee benefits packages balloon over the past decade,
employers have been forced either to scale back the health coverage they can offer
their employees or to require greater employee contributions. Employers have also
been forced to cut back dramatically the benefits they offer to their retirees. The re-
sults of these cutbacks have been dramatic. The number of Americans who have health
insurance covering prescription drug costs is dropping by roughly one million each
year.4
Perhaps the most vulnerable are the nation’s senior citizens who are heavily repre-
sented in the 38 percent of Americans of any age who have no prescription drug cover-
age. Not only are their former employers cutting back on the health benefits that they
offer to retirees, but HMOs that have long offered Medicare-plus benefits that have
included prescription drug coverage are scaling back or abandoning drug benefits alto-
gether.5  The result is that seniors are taking risks by sharing drugs, skipping doses, or
not taking their prescriptions at all.6
Because of the extent of the prescription drug crisis, and the ability of senior citi-
zens to get their voices heard on the issue, lawmakers at both national and state levels
have been under tremendous pressure to come up with a solution to the problem. The
federal Medicare program, which was established nearly forty years ago as a healthcare
plan for senior citizens, only covers drugs received in the hospital. With prescription
drugs playing such an important role in healthcare today, lawmakers are looking at
ways to expand Medicare to include drug coverage. Efforts to do that have grown only
more and more complicated and expensive, as drug costs have continued to rise.
The longer it takes the federal government to solve the Medicare/prescription drug
dilemma, the greater the pressure on state governments to solve the problem now or
soon. State governments, which are already struggling to deal with rising drug costs in
the administration of their Medicaid7 programs, are now being called on to ease the
burden for Medicare beneficiaries and the uninsured.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has been relatively progressive in this policy
area. Since the late 1990s, the state has offered pharmacy benefits for lower- income
seniors and the disabled of all ages. At the urging of former Congressman Joseph P.
Kennedy II, Massachusetts was one of the first states to consider a bulk-purchasing
initiative that would bring down the costs of drugs by aggregating purchases. In 2001,
Massachusetts launched a first-in-the-nation prescription drug insurance program for
all of the state’s senior citizens, regardless of income.
The path of prescription drug progress in Massachusetts has not been a smooth one
though. While Joseph Kennedy was successful in getting the state to pass a prescription
drug bulk-purchasing law, he was not successful in getting lawmakers to implement it.
Opposition from powerful special interest groups in the state and the ease with which
they supported the “lesser of two evils” insurance model proposed by Teresa Heinz,
ultimately killed the prospects of Kennedy’s initiative. Determined to use his bulk-
purchasing plan to help low-income elders to obtain drugs affordably, he ultimately
sidestepped the government to launch Citizens Health. The program has become a new
arm of his nonprofit Citizens Energy Corporation, which has provided heating oil at a
discount to low-income elders and working families for more than twenty years.
This case study will explore the prescription drug crisis, on both a national and state
level. It will provide insight into the Massachusetts approach to solving this problem
for seniors, as well as Kennedy’s efforts to encourage the state to implement a bulk-
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purchasing strategy. Finally, it will look at the creation of Citizens Health; how the
plan is designed, how it compares with other discount programs, and what lessons it
offers for policymakers who are considering similar approaches to solving this crisis
for their constituents.
Rising Prescription Drug Costs:
A National Crisis
The Citizens Health program is one private solution to an issue that, for many states,
has become a very public problem. The need for Citizens Health or a state-
sponsored prescription drug program is determined by policy decisions made at the
federal level. Since the prescription drug industry is one that crosses not only state,
but international borders, the bulk of the prescription drug debate takes place in
Washington. The major figures in that debate are members of Congress, lobbyists
for the drug industry, Veterans Affairs officials, and advocates for seniors and the
poor. At the center of the prescription drug discussion is the nation’s Medicare pro-
gram, and the question of how or if it can be expanded to cover prescription drug
costs for seniors.
Medicare: What Does It Cover?
The Medicare program was established in 1965 to provide national health insurance
for the elderly and disabled. The program consists of two parts. Part A, which is
financed by a 2.9 percent payroll tax paid by employers and employees, covers the
cost of most inpatient hospital costs. Part B, which is financed by premiums and
deductibles, is Medicare’s supplemental insurance program that covers the costs of
outpatient services and physicians. National data show that most Part A recipients
are also enrolled in Part B.8  Indeed, the Medicare card has both parts imprinted
upon it, and one becomes eligible at age sixty-five.
When Medicare was established, few would have predicted that the program’s
costs would balloon to the levels that they have reached today. The rising costs of
healthcare — medical inflation — roughly 10 percent per year, prompts fewer em-
ployers to offer benefits to retirees. Medicare membership has increased substan-
tially. While 19.2 million individuals received Medicare benefits in 1967, 40 million
elderly and disabled people are enrolled in the program today.9
Though Medicare covers the costs of inpatient prescription drugs, outpatient
drugs are excluded from the plan. Considering that most of the nation’s elderly
population uses prescription drugs, with half of them taking five or more medica-
tions a day,10  the prescription drug gap in Medicare coverage can be large and
costly. Beneficiaries are forced to fill the gap by paying for drugs in one of four
ways:  paying for enrollment in a Medicare HMO, paying for Medigap insurance
benefits, qualifying for Medicaid benefits, or paying out-of-pocket.11  Medicare
HMOs and Medigap plans are often too costly, and Medicaid requirements too strin-
gent. As a result, more than one-fourth of all Medicare recipients have no prescrip-
tion drug benefits,12  and are faced with the most costly option of paying for drugs
out-of-pocket.
In 1965, when prescription drugs were a relatively small part of overall
healthcare costs not typically covered by private insurance plans, it went virtually
unnoticed that Medicare did not cover outpatient drugs.13  Today, however, the lack
of a prescription drug benefit is perceived to be a critical missing piece in Medi-
care.14  A pharmaceutical industry source in Massachusetts remarks:
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Pharmaceuticals are about 10 percent of healthcare spending, but they are probably
about 70 percent of the cure. We’re doing most of the curing, and in the future, that’s
probably going to be more the case. To have a Medicare program not cover what is the
real future of healthcare is absurd.15
The problem has grown as drug costs have continued to rise dramatically in the
past decade, forcing private insurance plans to scale back coverage. In a report pre-
pared for President Clinton in 2000, the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services found that most sources of drug coverage for both the Medicare and non-
Medicare population are unstable.  Even more disturbing, the report finds that indi-
viduals without drug coverage and those who pay cash at the retail pharmacy pay a
higher price than the total price paid on behalf of those with drug coverage.16
The Expanding Pharmaceutical Industry
Last year, a survey was done, and the pharmaceutical industry came out as the most
hated industry in the United States — over the tobacco companies, which seems just
obscene. Drugs do save your life.
— Martha Morkan, Citizens Health17
The escalation of prescription drug costs was not an overnight occurrence. In fact, in
1974, author Victor Fuchs indicated that he saw the early stages of a prescription
drug crisis simmering. In his book, Who Shall Live, Fuchs wrote that the drug in-
dustry, on the surface, appeared consumer-friendly because it was not as highly
concentrated as some of the nation’s other industries, such as auto manufacturers and
the steel industry.18  Fuchs pointed out that the drug firms’ highly specialized output,
even in 1974, was troubling. “Major product categories like antihistamines,
antiinfectives, tranquilizers, cardiovascular preparations, gastrointestinal prepara-
tions cannot compete with one another for sales the way that Chryslers compete with
Chevrolets.”19  As a result, it was easy for drug firms to fix prices, and the lack of
competition across product types allowed the drug industry to maintain a higher
profit margin than other kinds of firms.20
At the time Fuchs was writing, critics were calling for more regulation in the
drug industry, but the drug firms argued that price limits would impede research. In
a criticism that mirrors those that are mounted against the drug industry today,
Fuchs wrote that while drug costs had remained relatively stable, only a small por-
tion of drug costs actually went toward the materials and research to produce
them.21  Another disturbing trend was the industry’s inconsistent pricing: the prices
charged by drug firms to pharmacies ran 500 percent higher than the prices charged
to hospitals. The discrepancy was due to the hospitals’ greater leverage in negotiat-
ing prices and their ability to test drugs for quality and safety.22
In the last two decades, many of Fuchs’s warnings about the rise in prescription
drug costs and the effects of Medicare’s failure to provide drug coverage to its ben-
eficiaries have been realized at levels that even Fuchs likely never imagined. As
more and more lifesaving drugs and therapies are developed, overall pharmaceutical
costs are skyrocketing, placing the possibility of a Medicare prescription drug ben-
efit even further out of reach. The drug industry source remarks, “It’s a Catch-22,
that we’re producing all of these new drugs, and they’re not covered. So people have
to pay cash, and can’t afford to get them, which is a genuine public policy dilemma
that ought to be solved.”23
The drug industry argues that there are legitimate reasons for the rising costs.
Pharmaceutical companies say that today’s costs are the result of private sector
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laboratories being chiefly responsible for the development of breakthrough drugs.24
The drug industry says it has produced effective drugs, and the high prices are sim-
ply reflective of high value. Price controls or any other limiting drug-cost policies,
they argue, would serve only to reverse the progress the industry has made in its
research. The industry contends that high prices in America are also a way of offset-
ting the losses suffered in countries where price controls are in effect.25  The same
Massachusetts drug industry source points out that Europe used to be the “hub of the
pharmaceutical industry.” Price controls in those countries and in Canada have hin-
dered research there, leaving Americans to foot the bill.26  “Americans are paying for
the [research and development], and the Canadians are freeloading off of us,” said
the source. Despite these industry claims, the pharmaceutical industry realizes an
average 18.6 percent return on revenues, while most other industries’ profit margins
range from 0.5 to 12.1 percent.27
Even given the inflated profit margins enjoyed by drug firms, lawmakers have
been reluctant to rein in the industry. Government watchdog groups contend that this
reluctance is because of the power and the money wielded by the drug industry
lobby. Since 1993, the drug industry has made over $33.4 million in campaign do-
nations. Lobbyists contribute to both Democrats and Republicans, with roughly 73
percent of the industry’s campaign money going to Republicans.28  Drug firms have
hired 297 lobbyists, which equals one lobbyist for every two members of Congress.
The drug industry argues, however, that these lobbying efforts have little impact on
public policy decisions. “When politicians see a good issue, they run with it,” said
the drug industry source. “They don’t say ‘who are my contributors,’ they say, ‘who
are the voters and where should I go with them.’”29
While drug firms try to justify rising prescription drug costs by citing the impor-
tance of ongoing research, critics question the basis of that claim, arguing that most
drug research is publicly funded.30  Studies prove that research funded by the public
sector is responsible for the most medically significant advances that have led to new
treatments of disease. Fifteen of the twenty-one drugs considered to have the highest
therapeutic value developed between 1965 and 1992 and most cancer and AIDS
drugs were developed as a result of taxpayer-funded research.31  Industry critics say
that the government develops the initial drug technology, transfers it to private cor-
porations for drug development, and then loses all control of pricing. To rectify this
problem, Representative Bernard Sanders of Vermont has sponsored legislation that
would restore “reasonable pricing” clauses on government-funded research.32  The
drug industry charges that these claims are simply attempts to discredit its research.
“They really want to discredit our industry,” says the drug industry source. “They
have to discredit our research because there are people who do great things in our
labs—and they’re voters.”33  The source acknowledges that the government does fund
“great research,” he says that it is also very basic and inexpensive research.34
While policymakers and scholars may differ about how to rectify the problem of
rising prescription drug costs, there seems to be some general consensus on why
drugs have become so costly. Most studies show that the rise in prescription drug
costs is owing more to an increased demand for prescription drugs, than increased
costs of the drugs.35
What’s rising is the number of drugs out there, and the number of people taking them.
Utilization is growing greatly, and that’s what’s driving the cost, not the actual price.
That’s why in some respects, a lot of the attempts to simply force down the price aren’t
going to do anything about the basic problem; that is, more and more people are relying
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on prescription drugs. People who may have taken one prescription ten years ago are
now taking three or four.36
Since 1990, U.S. spending on prescription drugs has more than doubled. As more
and more insurance plans expanded prescription drug coverage in the 1990s, the
demand for prescription drugs increased, and the number of prescriptions written
per patient rose significantly. Prescription drug use has also shifted toward newer,
more costly brand-name products, a trend that some attribute to the permissive regu-
lations of direct-to-consumer advertising.37
The Effects on Seniors
While the repercussions of high drug costs are felt throughout the American popula-
tion, the group that has been hardest hit is senior citizens. The nation’s elderly now
spend more on medicine than on doctors’ bills,38 and they are less likely than the rest
of the population to have prescription drug coverage. Studies show that only about
half of Medicare beneficiaries have drug coverage, and most sources of coverage are
insecure.39 Beneficiaries who have drug coverage through Medicare+Choice plans are
facing increased cost sharing as insurers lower the caps on annual drug expenses and
shrink drug benefits. The high cost of drugs has also forced employers to lessen the
benefits offered to their retirees.40
The result is that the nation’s elderly are struggling to find ways to pay for the
drugs they need, or, in some cases, forgoing their drug treatments altogether. In his
testimony before Congress in February 2000, Dr. Alan Sager, Professor of Health
Services at the Boston University School of Public Health, reported that 17 percent
of Americans and 42 percent of uninsured Americans have reported not filling pre-
scriptions for financial reasons.41
Senior citizens in particular have grown increasingly creative in their efforts to
seek out discounted prices on the drugs they need. A growing number of seniors are
hopping on buses and trekking across the U.S. border to Canada, where price con-
trols keep drug prices at more affordable levels. Seniors who go to Canada are able
to buy the drugs they need at prices that are 30 to 70 percent less than in the United
States.42 But the drugs that are available in Canada are limited, says the drug indus-
try source who points out that he’s seen seniors hop off the bus in Maine to buy their
chemotherapy pills because they simply aren’t available yet in Canada.43  It took one
breakthrough Alzheimer’s drug four years after it went on sale in the United States
to become available in Canada. “If you have Alzheimer’s, you don’t have that long,”
the source said.44
For those seniors who don’t take the bus rides, many are finding the Internet to
be a valuable tool for finding lower drug prices in Canada. In August 2001, the
Boston Globe told the story of Isaac BenEzra, seventy-five, who has traveled to
various senior citizen centers across Western Massachusetts and taught hundreds of
seniors how to place their drug orders with Canadian Internet pharmacies. BenEzra
has also reached out to doctors, persuading them to write prescriptions for their
patients and fax them directly to CanadaRX.45 While buying online can help seniors
save money on drugs, the practice is not entirely safe, or legal. While there is little
the government can do to enforce them, there are laws on the books that prohibit
buying drugs from sites outside the United States. The FDA warns that seniors are
putting themselves at risk when they buy drugs online, and could wind up receiving
drugs that are contaminated or counterfeit.46 Other industry experts point out that
when seniors purchase drugs on their own they are putting themselves in danger.
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With many seniors today visiting a number of different physicians to treat different
conditions, there is often no single pharmacist or doctor to gauge dosages or poten-
tial drug interactions. Martha Morkan, Director of Marketing and Community Out-
reach for Citizens Health, points out, “One hundred thousand seniors die every year
because of poly-pharmacy, and it’s because they don’t have one single place that
tracks the drugs they’re taking.”47
Potential Solutions
While many scholars contend that the federal government could ease the burden of
rising drug costs for seniors by simply expanding Medicare to include prescription
drugs,48 the cost of such a program, with drug costs at their current levels, makes it
extremely difficult for lawmakers to create a cost-effective plan to do so. In fact,
simply expanding Medicare to include a drug benefit would only serve to boost the
demand for drugs at their current prices.49 In order to keep a Medicare drug benefit
affordable, the government would need to find a way to regulate the costs of drugs.
 Many argue that the federal government, which is able to purchase drugs at
discounted rates for veterans, the military, and Medicaid programs, could buy pre-
scription drugs at the same rates for Medicare recipients.50 Such a plan could have a
significant impact on private insurers, however, as drug companies would look for
ways to make up for the reduction in profits they would incur if the government
expanded their bulk-purchasing efforts. In addition, a sweeping government bulk-
purchasing plan would be perceived by the drug industry as a huge step toward gov-
ernment price controls, something one industry source says “would be the death of
the industry.”51 Still, other nations are using price controls to keep drug costs down
for their citizens, and the United States may look to them for models for reform.
The pharmaceutical industry, however, remains steadfast in its argument that such a
measure would drastically harm research, a weighty claim that will require the gov-
ernment to proceed cautiously.52
Careful U.S. action is vital to protecting and promoting research. Unlike other nations,
and unlike some U.S. states, the United States government cannot simply cut drug
prices without regard for the cuts’ effects on research. Because we buy so great a share
(and an increasing share) of the world’s brand name drugs, the world’s drug makers
rely on the U.S. market for a disproportionate share of their profits and the dollars they
require to finance research.53
Divided Along Party Lines
While many policymakers, both Republican and Democrat, are unified in their op-
position to price controls, the two parties do differ, at least at the national level, on
how the government might enable the nation’s elderly to get their prescription drugs
affordably. Most Democrats prefer an expansion of the Medicare program to include
prescription drug coverage. Most Republicans, though, believe Medicare should give
subsidies to private health plans to provide drug coverage.54 Contrast between the
Democratic and Republican approaches was brought sharply into focus during the
2000 campaign for President. While on the campaign trail, George Bush and Al
Gore each pushed a dramatically different plan for making drugs affordable for
seniors.55 Gore proposed spending $253 billion over ten years to expand Medicare to
include a prescription drug benefit. Bush’s plan, which carried a smaller price tag of
$158 billion over ten years, offered a smaller prescription drug subsidy than Gore’s,
but allowed seniors to seek drug coverage from private plans. While critics have
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argued that the private market is too unstable for seniors to rely on it for affordable
drug coverage, Bush argued that private insurers would be forced to compete by
offering a variety of plans for seniors to choose from.56 The Bush plan ignored the
fact that Medicare beneficiaries who are already trying to fill the current prescrip-
tion drug gap by enrolling in additional plans are either finding their coverage inad-
equate or unaffordable.57
Healthcare experts appear to be watching closely to see what President Bush’s
next move will be on the prescription drug issue. In recent months, Bush has pushed
a plan that would promote the use of drug discount cards by Medicare beneficiaries,
a plan that the President says will result in savings as high as 40 percent on prescrip-
tion drug purchases. Certain insurers and companies that manage drug benefits
would ultimately pay for the plan. They would sign up to offer discount cards in
exchange for gaining experience and information about drug use among senior citi-
zens. Democrats have argued, however, that the plan would not provide significant
savings for seniors; they accuse Bush of using the discount card strategy to avoid the
addition of drug costs to Medicare benefits.58
In January 2002, President Bush proposed spending $190 billion over the next ten
years to improve Medicare coverage and provide prescription drug coverage to se-
nior citizens. The plan, which also includes an increase in Medicare payments to
health maintenance organizations to keep HMOs from exiting Medicare, calls for the
federal government to pay for 90 percent of prescription drug costs while the states
pay for the remaining 10 percent. The plan would also allow states to run programs
that would provide Medicaid coverage solely for prescription drugs. Lawmakers
from both parties challenged Bush’s plan, claiming that the total price tag would
have to increase by at least 50 percent to cover the costs. Bush’s plan also focuses on
providing drug benefits solely for low-income seniors, while most lawmakers are
pushing for drug coverage for all Medicare beneficiaries.59
The States Respond
While the debate over how to implement a Medicare prescription drug benefit has
stalled on Capitol Hill, states have been pressed to implement programs that will fill
the prescription drug coverage gap. While national leaders may have been able to
turn a deaf ear to the calls from senior advocates and delay action on the prescrip-
tion drug issue, state and local leaders, who are closer and often held more account-
able to their constituencies, have not. While all state governments have been forced
to pay for prescription drugs on a broad scale through Medicaid programs, many
have taken their coverage a step further by adding pharmacy programs to address the
needs of those who do not qualify for Medicaid but still cannot afford to pay for
prescription drugs.60 This is a segment of the population that the federal government
simply has not been able to reach yet.
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, twenty-eight states
have passed some form of pharmaceutical assistance law, while three states are ad-
dressing the issue through executive agency initiatives.61 While states are using a
variety of approaches to meet the prescription drug needs of their constituents, most
are committing state funds to cover at least a portion of the costs of residents who
meet specific criteria. Some states are experimenting with various forms of price
controls and bulk-purchasing while others are working to extend Medicaid drug
prices to more seniors.62 Some states are offering cost-sharing programs that require
enrollees to help cover costs through co-payments, annual fees, or monthly
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thresholds, and a handful of states are experimenting with drug discount cards. While
most states are developing programs to help only low-income individuals, others,
including Massachusetts, are boldly aiming to assist all seniors who are uninsured.63
Their distance from the direct influence of the drug industry has allowed states to
be more ambitious in the plans they develop. As Professor Alan Sager points out,
“States can act to cut drug prices without worrying about the consequences for re-
search. The federal government cannot do so.”64 Even states that offer the most
comprehensive coverage, acknowledge that state programs are simply “stopgap” mea-
sures that will hold the line only until the federal government passes a prescription
drug benefit.65
New England, in particular, has been a hotbed for prescription drug policy. The
state of Maine has been the most aggressive in its efforts to reduce prescription drug
costs for residents. The “Maine Rx” program — which aims to provide reduced drug
costs for residents who are at or below 300 percent of Federal Poverty Level (FPL)
and have no prescription drug coverage — offers reduced drug prices by negotiating
rebates from manufacturers. (FPL for single persons is $8,590; for a family of 2 it is
$11,610; for a family of 3 it is $14,510; and for a family of 4 it is $17,650.) Though
the implementation of this program has been stymied by lawsuits from the drug in-
dustry, the courts have upheld the legality of the program and policymakers are opti-
mistic that the plan will yield significant savings for the uninsured.66 In 2001, Maine
joined New Hampshire and Vermont to form a tri-state buying pool, which aims to
cut state drug costs by aggregating the Medicaid drug purchases of the three states.67
Senior advocates are praising the states for their innovation in tackling the prescrip-
tion drug issue.
It will be really interesting to see which approaches end up being the most beneficial.
In every state right now, their efforts are laudable, because they are thinking of different
ways to take on this one issue. We’re happy to see states are trying to take on this
issue.68
Solving the Problem at the State Level:
The Massachusetts Strategy
Early Attempts
In the last decade, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has been relatively progres-
sive in its approach to making drugs affordable for seniors and the disabled. As pre-
scription drug costs have continued to rise, the Commonwealth has responded by
implementing laws and programs that have grown incrementally more and more ag-
gressive over the years. In 1994 the Commonwealth enacted the Medicare Supple-
mental Insurance law. The law required that all health insurers that offered Medigap69
products offer at least one plan that included unlimited prescription drug coverage. In
addition to increasing coverage for needy seniors, the law was designed to “level the
playing field” for all insurers that were sharing in the Medicare
Supplemental Market, so that no single insurer would be forced to bear the brunt of
high-cost enrollees. By 1998, approximately 61,000 Medicare beneficiaries in Massa-
chusetts were enrolled in Medicare HMO-plus plans.70
Despite this law, there was still a segment of the senior population that was falling
through the cracks where prescription drug coverage was concerned, and that was the
Medicare population that couldn’t afford to pay the premiums associated with
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Medicare-plus plans.71 To assist these individuals, the Legislature in 1996 created the
Senior Pharmacy program. Termed the “Montigny/McDonough Act” after the bill’s
sponsors, Senator Mark Montigny and Representative John McDonough, the bill
increased the tobacco tax to subsidize a drug program for low-income seniors. It was
the first totally state-subsidized program in Massachusetts, which made it very much
on the cutting-edge for that time.72
To start, the program provided up to $500 annually in prescription drug coverage
for seniors who were 133 percent of FPL. As drug costs continued to rise, the pro-
gram was expanded to reach more people and offer more coverage. In fiscal year
1998, annual coverage was boosted to $750 annually for seniors who were 150 per-
cent of FPL, and in fiscal year 1999, annual coverage was increased to $1,250 for
seniors who were 188 percent of FPL. As a result, enrollment in the Senior Phar-
macy Program nearly doubled from 18,500 in 1997 to 33,200 in 1999.73
Prescription Drug Costs Hit the Commonwealth Hard in 1999
A change in federal law in 1997 had enormous implications for the need for com-
prehensive prescription drug coverage in Massachusetts. “Medicare + Choice”
Medicare reform provisions in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 prohibited the
Commonwealth from requiring Medicare HMOs to provide the unlimited drug ben-
efit option.74 As a result, on January 1, 1999, Medicare HMOs in Massachusetts
drastically reduced their drug benefits, replacing unlimited benefits with caps on
annual coverage ranging from $300 to $800 per year.
That created an environment where…people no longer had unlimited options for cover-
age for drugs. What that created was an aggressive ramp up or an aggressive benefit for
the pharmacy program that was in place at the time. That really defined, at least for the
state, the problem.75
It quickly became clear to Massachusetts lawmakers that the existing Pharmacy Pro-
gram would have to be expanded, and quickly. In June 1999, Senate President Tom
Birmingham proposed that the state double its funding for the Pharmacy Program,
in turn raising the yearly cap on an individual’s benefits from $750 to $1,250 annu-
ally. The program would also be expanded to include a Senior Pharmacy Plus plan,
which would allow seniors up to 500 percent of FPL to receive unlimited coverage
for catastrophic drug costs.76 The plan was implemented, and in fiscal year 2000,
enrollment spiked to 67,000 in the Senior Pharmacy Program plus an additional
8,190 individuals who were enrolled in the Senior Pharmacy Plus Program.77
With more and more seniors seeking refuge from skyrocketing prescription drug
costs under the umbrella of the state Pharmacy Program, lawmakers found them-
selves searching for new and innovative strategies through which they could provide
some relief. Their search ultimately led them to consider two very different ap-
proaches for crafting a cost-effective solution to what had become a very political,
and highly charged, public policy problem.
The Battle of the Two Plans: Joe Kennedy vs. Teresa Heinz
After spending twelve years in Congress, Representative Joseph P. Kennedy II knew
that Congress was not ready to address the issue of rising prescription drug costs
when he returned to Massachusetts in 1998. This notion prompted him to launch a
comprehensive study of how to deal with the problem at the state level. Building on
his experience in running Citizens Energy, which provides heating oil to low-income
individuals by purchasing it in bulk, he began to explore the feasibility of a bulk-
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purchasing plan for prescription drugs. The savings generated by buying drugs in
bulk, Kennedy figured, could be passed along to the people of Massachusetts who
were unable, at that time, to obtain drugs affordably.78
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts was already purchasing drugs on the behalf
of a number of groups including the Pharmacy Program members, state employees,
Medicaid beneficiaries, prisoners, and public hospitals. What Kennedy couldn’t
reconcile was, why were all of these purchases made separately?
Thousands of people in Massachusetts have their drugs purchased by the Common-
wealth on their behalf, but there’s no single entity that buys drugs for all of those
people. Joe said, “If you put all those people together, you can really leverage some
lower prices. And if you take that lower price and you extend it to anybody who doesn’t
have insurance, you can really make a huge difference in those people’s lives.”79
Kennedy took this concept of bulk-purchasing to Massachusetts lawmakers and en-
couraged them to establish it as state law. Senator Mark Montigny, Chairman of the
Senate Ways and Means Committee, was particularly supportive of the idea and
worked with Kennedy to mold the concept into a policy initiative. During the
FY2000 budget discussions, Montigny and Kennedy drafted a prescription drug
bulk-purchasing program for the state. The bill (an outside budget rider) called on
the Administration to release a Request for Proposal (RFP) for a contract to aggre-
gate the drug purchases of Medicaid, the Group Insurance Commission,80 the
Department of Elder Affairs, and the Department of Public Health. The proposal
became law in November 1999, as Section 271, chapter 127, of the Acts of 1999
(see Appendix B). The Executive Office of Administration & Finance was allotted
sixty days to research the proposal and draft the RFP for the contract to administer
the program. Despite several assurances from the Administration that the project was
being studied, the RFP was never drafted.81
Teresa Heinz Pushes the HOPE Plan
While Joe Kennedy was lobbying state leaders to implement his bulk-purchasing
program, another very powerful name in politics had gotten their ear as well. In
2000, Teresa Heinz, the wife of Massachusetts U.S. Senator John Kerry, was encour-
aging the state’s policymakers to adopt a prescription drug program crafted by the
Heinz Family Philanthropies, a private foundation that she chairs. The Heinz Plan to
Overcome Prescription Drug Expenses, or the HOPE plan, laid the groundwork for
a state-run insurance program that would be offered to all 860,000 senior citizens
(age sixty-five and over) in Massachusetts, as well as low-income disabled individu-
als.82 Heinz unveiled the plan to the public on April 5, 2000, announcing that she
was pursuing the initiative in honor of her late husband, Senator John Heinz. Heinz,
who pushed for prescription drug coverage for seniors while serving in the U.S.
Senate, died in 1987.83
The HOPE plan was billed as “budget-neutral,” requiring the state to maintain
funding at the present levels committed to the Senior Pharmacy and Pharmacy Plus
programs.84 This feature was one of the plan’s four guiding principles:
• Comprehensive drug coverage
• Responsible access to all prescription drugs
• Affordability
• Budget neutrality for the Commonwealth85
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The HOPE plan was built on an insurance model, requiring members to pay annual
deductibles, premiums, and drug co-payments. It differed from a traditional insur-
ance plan for low-income members in that the state would subsidize deductibles and
premiums. Rates for higher-income members would be set according to their income
categories. The plan aimed to provide members with access to all prescription drugs
“through a balanced cost share and incentive formulary.” It would require the state
to contract with a Pharmacy Benefits Manager (PBM) that would provide adminis-
trative and management services at reduced costs.86 It also included an annual cap of
$3,000 on out-of-pocket spending to protect members from incurring catastrophic
drug costs, which, policymakers say, may have been one of the plan’s most attractive
features:
It was originally designed, if you look at the original HOPE program, as a catastrophic
plan. It was really for people who had high costs, astronomical costs, to buy a product
that would protect them from these really expensive drug costs.87
Similar to a private insurance plan, HOPE’s success would be contingent upon
the mix of individuals who enrolled in the program. If implemented, then low-
income seniors, who were previously receiving drug coverage under the state’s Phar-
macy Program, would not be required to pay premiums and deductibles. Their costs
would be offset by seniors at higher income levels, who would pay monthly premi-
ums and annual deductibles. Premium and deductible rates would be set according to
individual income levels. The Heinz Family Philanthropies pointed out that attract-
ing the right mix of low-risk and high-risk members would require the state to
advertise the program, so that middle-class and higher income seniors would be
encouraged to buy coverage.88
The Massachusetts Legislature took a good hard look at the Heinz plan, and ulti-
mately decided that it was an initiative worth pursuing. It was imperative, though,
that policymakers proceed cautiously. No state had launched an insurance program
like the HOPE plan, so there were no examples for Massachusetts lawmakers to
follow as they drafted the legislation that would eventually make the HOPE plan
law. “This was revolutionary,” said a Prescription Advantage administrator.89
The HOPE plan was generally well received by senior advocates and the media,
including the Boston Globe, which wrote in an editorial, “Elders would no longer
have to fear the prospect of drug bills without limit if they contracted a chronic
disease.”90 Opposition to the plan included some major players in the pharmaceutical
industry, who wouldn’t support the plan because it was going to be run by a PBM,
which meant that some drugs would be restricted or cost more than others.91 For the
business community, the plan raised other concerns. Jon Hurst of the Massachusetts
Retailers Association spoke out in a letter to the editor of the Boston Globe, express-
ing concern over another of the plan’s aspects, which was the promotion of mail-
order drug services for members. Hurst warned that “this proposal will damage not
only community pharmacies but also the health and convenience of elderly consum-
ers.”92
The final product that came out of legislative committee was far from an exact
replica of the HOPE plan that Heinz had proposed. “[It passed] with what I think
would be minor changes, but they think they are major,” Tom Dehner of Senator
Montigny’s office recalls.93 One of the key changes involved protecting those en-
rolled in the existing Senior Pharmacy Program. Senior advocacy groups and many
lawmakers were concerned that the Heinz proposal would actually be more costly
for those seniors. “The Senate, and advocates like the Massachusetts Senior Action
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Council, fought hard to protect low-income seniors from increased costs, in the
form of co-payments, premiums [and the like],” Dehner says. Senator Montigny, in
particular, fought to make sure that all of those who were enrolled in the Senior
Pharmacy Program would be included in the new plan at a very low cost.94 The
other major change to the Heinz proposal in terms of coverage was a lower cap on
annual out-of-pocket expenses. While the HOPE plan had recommended a cap of
$3,000 on annual expenses,95 the final version of the plan that came out of the Leg-
islature set the cap at $2,000.96 Changes intact, Governor Cellucci signed the plan
into law in July 2000.97 It was eventually named Prescription Advantage. The statute
called for the program to be implemented in concert with Section 271.98
Section 271 Under Fire
The arrival of the Heinz proposal changed the entire landscape of the prescription
drug debate in Massachusetts, and it galvanized what had become mounting opposi-
tion to Section 271. From the moment it passed as an outside section of the budget
in November 1999, Section 271 faced strong opposition from three groups that have
powerful voices on Beacon Hill: patients’ advocacy groups, pharmaceutical compa-
nies, and the biotechnology industry.
The criticism from the pharmaceutical industry stemmed from the idea that ag-
gregating the drug purchases of so many different groups would require the state to
contract with a PBM. In order for the PBM to negotiate the promised discounts, the
state would likely have to restrict access to a large number of important drugs. A
drug industry source recalls:
Under the Section 271 law, their goal was to put all of these people under one PBM,
and what they were talking about was savings of 30 to 40 percent. . . . I know the
business, we’re the manufacturers, we deal with it every day. In order to achieve a 30 or
40 percent discount, you’d have to exclude large numbers of drugs that were available.
Otherwise, manufacturers would have no incentive to give you that price. . . . They trade
a price reduction for a certain market share, that’s the way it works.99
This scenario sent shockwaves throughout the pharmaceutical and biotechnology
industries in Massachusetts. Representatives from both industries began lobbying
Beacon Hill heavily to drop the Section 271 proposal. Both groups painted bleak
pictures of what the prescription drug situation would look like if Section 271 were
implemented, and patient advocacy groups became concerned that their constituents
would lose access to the drugs that they need.
In letters to Governor Cellucci and state legislators, patient advocates sharply
criticized Section 271, charging that its implementation would restrict access to
important drugs. In December 1999, members of the Washington-based Kidney
Cancer Association held a press conference at the State House to express their fear
that the implementation of Section 271 would restrict access to many FDA-approved
drugs, substituting less expensive drugs in their place.100
The biotechnology industry, a powerful lobby on Beacon Hill,101 also flooded the
Cellucci Administration with letters opposing Section 271. They argued that the
initiative was a step toward “price controls,” which if implemented would ultimately
obstruct research and development efforts. The pharmaceutical industry funded a
study that highlighted a number of issues for the Secretary of Administration and
Finance to consider before implementing Section 271. The report, prepared at the
request of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, raised con-
cerns about administrative costs, the scope of coverage, and methods of drug
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distribution under 271.102 The study warned the Administration to be mindful of the
potential impacts that Section 271 would have on pharmacies and HMOs in the
Commonwealth. It also raised the point that the Commonwealth, if it were to as-
sume the role of purchaser and distributor of drugs, could open itself up to potential
lawsuits in the cases of labeling errors and delivering or filling the prescriptions for
much-needed drugs.103 Also, since Section 271 would extend drug coverage to both
the uninsured and the “underinsured,” the study points out that the Administration
would have to define exactly who the “underinsured” were.104 The PhRMA study,
like the biotechnology industry, raised the issue of how the state would maintain the
quality of prescription drug benefits through contracting with a PBM.105
The PBM restrictions were not the only aspects of Section 271 that provoked
criticism. Members of the business community expressed concern that Section 271
would result in cost increases for private insurers, forcing Massachusetts employers
to cut benefits. Jon Hurst of the Massachusetts Retailers Association, as he did with
the Prescription Advantage Program, expressed concerns that the plan would
contract with mail-order pharmacies, which could harm relationships between phar-
macists and consumers and ultimately result in lower quality healthcare. The Massa-
chusetts Taxpayers Foundation charged, “Enacting this proposal could result in the
loss of federal Medicaid rebates and could increase costs by promoting adverse
selection.” Critics of 271 were well-organized and relentless in their efforts to thwart
the implementation of this plan.
Criticism Directed at Kennedy
Despite the mounting opposition to Section 271, Joe Kennedy was steadfast in his
efforts to persuade lawmakers to implement the bulk-purchasing plan. At a public
forum in March of 2000, Kennedy expressed his frustration with the Adminis-
tration’s failure to implement Section 271, and singled out drug-makers as the pri-
mary reason. “We could solve this problem overnight,” Kennedy said, “but the prob-
lem is there are interests in our state and our country that make money selling drugs
at high prices.” Senator Montigny, who had joined Kennedy in prodding state law-
makers to implement the initiative, was also growing frustrated because the bulk-
purchasing program was being ignored.106
The plan’s critics continued to press on, with some charging that Section 271 was
passed quietly and was not subject to public hearings:
The way the legislation was passed was not the way legislation should be passed. It was
slipped into the budget and it was signed. There were not hearings on it. There was not
a great deal of process to closely examine what the issues were. [Had there been,]
people would have understood the practical difficulties of implementing something like
that and the dangers of implementing something like that.107
Kennedy and Montigny did hold a public forum on the issue, after the initiative had
passed, in March 2000. During that forum, Kennedy laid out two options for the
state:
•  The state could expand its current contract with Express Scripts,108 to
aggregate drug buying for the state.
•  The state could procure a contract for aggregate buying at a lower
cost by putting it out to bid.
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Trevor Hughes of the Statehouse News Service wrote about the forum: “While the
forum was intended to gather public input on the plan, after about an hour, only
Kennedy and Montigny had spoken.”109
Some of the criticism surrounding Section 271 was directed at Kennedy person-
ally. Several published reports suggested that Kennedy was pushing the plan because
his nonprofit company, Citizen’s Energy, could ultimately bid on the contract to
administer the program. In his letter to Governor Cellucci, Jon Hurst wrote:
This language appeared out of nowhere — it did not exist in either the House or the
Senate passed budgets, nor did it exist as a stand-alone bill. Thus no hearings, floor
debate, or public scrutiny whatsoever has occurred on this proposal. Reportedly a
proposal of former congressman Joe Kennedy of Citizens Energy, this section makes
the Commonwealth (through a nonprofit entity like Citizens Energy) a socialized pur-
chaser of prescription drugs for an undetermined number of residents of the state.
The idea that Kennedy was pushing the plan because he had an interest in winning
the contract was also mentioned in a Boston Globe editorial that called on the
Cellucci Administration to implement the plan: “Kennedy acknowledges that Citi-
zens Energy would earn a fee from this work that might total $1 million.”110
Kennedy’s battle with the Administration grew even more complicated when the
Group Insurance Commission (GIC) signed a new contract with Express Scripts,
making the implementation of Section 271 even more difficult.111 Unless the state
threw out the new GIC contract, 60,000 state employees, retirees, and their families
would now have to be excluded from Section 271 if it were implemented.112 But if it
scrapped the contract, the state risked facing a $10 million lawsuit. Despite these
potential consequences, in a story that landed on the front page of the Boston Her-
ald, Kennedy called on the state to scrap the $375 million prescription drug con-
tract. He argued that excluding GIC members would dramatically reduce the impact
of Section 271 because the number of people for whom the state would buy drugs
would be far smaller, thus reducing the state’s ability to negotiate discounts.
Kennedy’s critics responded by alleging that Kennedy only wanted the initiative to
be implemented so he could get the business for himself. The Herald cited unnamed
sources who accused Kennedy of lobbying for the program in such a way that would
position Citizens Energy to win the job of marketing the bulk-purchasing plan to
poor seniors. Kennedy staunchly denied that criticism:
You have to be able to go out and create relationships and identify the poor and [other
people] who would be eligible, Kennedy told the Herald. It’s perfectly fine with me if
the state wants to open [those services] up [to bidders]. I’m not suggesting in any way
that Citizens should get a no-bid contract.113
Facing unfaltering opposition from Governor Cellucci’s Secretary of Administration
and Finance Peter Forman,114 Kennedy finally “threw in the towel” on pushing the
Administration to adopt his plan but vowed he would not give up on the idea for
good: “Now we’ll just move on, do it another way. All we wanted to do was to save
millions of dollars in drug costs for the poor.”115
Prescription Advantage Provides an Alternative
Further exacerbating Kennedy’s efforts for action on Section 271 was the ease with
which Teresa Heinz’s HOPE program was embraced by the Cellucci Administration
and the Legislature. After the HOPE plan was signed into law in July 2000, she was
successful in persuading Governor Cellucci to delay the implementation of Section
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271 while the Heinz Family Philanthropies researched the potential impact of both
programs being implemented simultaneously. Heinz argued that she wanted to deter-
mine whether the implementation of Kennedy’s plan would increase adverse selec-
tion116 in the HOPE plan, prompting Cellucci to agree to put Section 271 on hold.117
Joe Kennedy did not blame Heinz for stymieing his plan, but lashed out at the phar-
maceutical industry instead. Brian O’Connor, spokesman for Citizens Energy
charged:
Here in Massachusetts, [pharmaceutical companies] have lobbied successfully to post-
pone implementation of the drug price-discount law, which would secure for ordinary
people the kind of price cuts now available to only the biggest customers. Further delays
will only serve to allow the pharmaceutical companies to continue getting away with
charging the greatest number of people the highest possible prices for the longest pos-
sible time.118
The HOPE plan provided lawmakers with an easy alternative to Section 271.
While 271 sparked letters of protest from powerful sources like the biotechnology
industry, patient advocates groups, and business associations, the HOPE plan, par-
ticularly after the Legislature tinkered with it, did not come with as much baggage.
“Patients liked it, seniors groups came out in favor of it, patient advocate groups
liked it, so the politics were cleaner and easier, I think, in getting the Heinz plan
passed.”119
While pharmaceutical companies were not entirely supportive of the plan because
of concerns over the limitations of the Prescription Advantage formulary, the bio-
technology industry embraced the plan enthusiastically. Its support became particu-
larly overt once the industry’s lobbyists were successful in persuading legislators to
assure that the industry’s drugs would be fully covered under the plan.120 The
industry’s support was also likely rooted in the idea that it had more to lose if a
price control initiative like Section 271 were pursued, because the drugs the biotech-
nology industry makes are extremely expensive.121 “The industry succeeded in strip-
ping a provision that would have kept high-cost ‘non-preferred’ drugs, such as those
biotech companies are now bringing to market, from counting toward the cap on
out-of-pocket expenses.”122 Testifying before the Committee on Health Care in April
of 2001, Janice T. Bourque, CEO and president of the Massachusetts Biotechnology
Council, congratulated lawmakers on their efforts to implement Prescription Advan-
tage:
In creating the [Prescription] Advantage plan, Massachusetts government has done what
the government does best. It has looked out for the interests of one segment of the
community – seniors and others with prescription drug needs – without damaging the
interests of another segment of the community, the companies that research, develop,
and manufacture these same prescription drugs.123
A policy analyst in Senator Montigny’s office says he was not surprised by the level
of support that drug-makers had thrown behind the Heinz plan: “They understood
that the way to deflect attention from 271 was to say it would lead to price controls,
and to support Prescription Advantage. Someone is getting this $100 million [appro-
priation for Prescription Advantage], they’re not stupid.”124
Implementing Prescription Advantage
On March 14, 2001, only eight months after Prescription Advantage was signed into
law, Lillian Glickman, the Massachusetts Secretary of Elder Affairs, laid out the
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guidelines for the administration of the program. Eligibility was open to citizens
over the age of sixty-five, members of the existing Pharmacy Program, and disabled
individuals under sixty-five whose household incomes were less than 188 percent of
FPL.125 The program was not open to citizens eligible for Medicaid. In Glickman’s
“Emergency Regulations for The Prescription Drug Insurance Plan,” she laid out the
following guidelines:
•  All enrollees will pay co-payments. Enrollees below 200% of FPL pay
lower co-payments. All enrollees pay lower co-payments for mail-order
maintenance drugs.
•  For the plan year beginning April 1, 2001, the full premium will be $82
per month. Enrollees at or below 188% of FPL will be eligible to have
their premiums paid by the Commonwealth. Enrollees above 188% will
be eligible to have the Commonwealth pay for some of their premium
based on gross annual household income.
•  Deductibles will range between $100 and $500 per year during the first
year. Enrollees below 188% of FPL will have their deductibles paid by
the Commonwealth.
•  Once an enrollee meets the annual deductible amount, the enrollee will
make co-payments and Prescription Advantage will cover the remaining
cost. Maximum out of pocket expenses for co-payments and deductibles
(excluding premiums) will be the lesser of $2,000 or 10% of gross
annual household income.
•  Premiums, deductibles, and co-payments will be reviewed and adjusted
annually.
•  Prescription Advantage will have a formulary (a list of drugs paid for by
the plan). No prescription drug can be excluded from the formulary
unless there is a therapeutic equivalent on the formulary.126
Billed as the “First in the nation state-backed insurance plan for prescription
drugs,”127 Prescription Advantage opened for business on April 1, 2001.
Prescription Advantage partnered with four other entities to administer the pro-
gram. Advance PCS was hired to serve as the plan’s PBM. The University of Massa-
chusetts was awarded the contract to manage enrollment and customer service for
the program. William M. Mercer, Incorporated, which helped design the original
HOPE framework, was hired to serve as a consultant for the program. Shandwick
International won the contract to do outreach and marketing.128
The program’s marketing efforts came under fire from lawmakers and senior
advocates in the final months leading up to the launch of Prescription Advantage. In
March, Glickman was facing criticism from both lawmakers and senior advocates
who felt that her office was not doing enough outreach to attract members to the
program. By the end of March, just days before the program was due to launch,
only fourteen thousand individuals had enrolled in the plan, all of whom were ab-
sorbed into the program as a result of their previous membership in the state Phar-
macy Program.129  The launch of a mass media campaign to promote the program
was delayed until May 1 — one month after the program’s start date, which
concerned some legislators and groups like the Massachusetts Senior Action Council,
because the plan’s success was contingent upon its ability to attract higher income,
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healthy members. Because of the plan’s slow start, Michael Widmer, of the Massa-
chusetts Taxpayers Foundation, warned that the plan’s costs would likely far exceed
what had been projected for the year.130
Despite the marketing setback, enrollment in the state’s Pharmacy and Pharmacy
Plus programs was halted mid-March 2001, and Prescription Advantage began on
April 1, 2001. For the Executive Office of Elder Affairs, the first priority was to
move all of the members in the Pharmacy programs into Prescription Advantage.131
Senior advocacy groups and local councils on aging notified Pharmacy and Phar-
macy Plus members of Prescription Advantage through education and outreach ef-
forts.132 Members were also notified through the mail.133 Within the first five months,
the state was able to successfully move about 90 percent of Pharmacy Program
members into Prescription Advantage.134 For the remaining 10 percent, a major
problem cited was higher costs, as co-payments under the new program were higher
than they were under the Pharmacy Program.135 In addition, some of the members’
income levels required them to pay premiums, which did not exist in the old plan.
The required premiums and deductibles varied according to eight different income
categories, with one being the lowest (members at or below 188 percent FPL) and
eight being the highest (household income of $58,057+). “People really had to look
into this program to see how they would fit, based on their income,” a Prescription
Advantage administrator says.136
Is Prescription Advantage Meeting its Goals?
Because of the requirement that low-income elders from the Pharmacy Program be
moved seamlessly into Prescription Advantage, after one year in existence approxi-
mately 80 percent of the program’s membership resided in the Category one income
group. Though these early statistics may have some policymakers worried that only
high-cost elders will join the plan, Prescription Advantage administrators were opti-
mistic that the mix of members would change once they moved into the next phase
of their marketing plan in the spring of 2002.137 “The strategy going forward, start-
ing March 1, [2002,] is to attract premium payers. We have to do this aggressively,”
a Prescription Advantage administrator said.
One of the interesting things that I noted was: during the transition, after October, when
we looked at our numbers, the new people that were in the plan, the people that had
never been in the Pharmacy Plus or Pharmacy Program, the new people that had joined
were about 60 percent category one, and 40 percent were all premium payers. Which
told me, at least as an administrator, that, boy, this would have been at least 50 percent
non-risk. It would have been closer to an insurance model, where the [premium payers]
would be offsetting the costs of [category one members].138
While some policymakers feared the Prescription Advantage program would
simply become too expensive for the state to afford,139 administrators say the
program has not become the budget buster that many feared it would. “We were
projected to spend about $99 million in fiscal year 2002. I am projecting we’ll
spend $80 million,” said a Prescription Advantage administrator.140 Furthermore,
while the plan was projected to carry a $200 million price tag by fiscal year 2003,
the program administrator says he expects the total cost to be about $100 million.
He credits the low cost to the three-tier formulary, which consists of generic, select
brand name, and additional brand name drugs. The administrator also touts a 24
percent discount on the average wholesale price (AWP) of drugs secured through the
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PBM as a key to savings. “Given the fact that you have such a large pool of mem-
bers in category one who are only paying co-pays, it is significant that our expendi-
ture is so much lower than what was expected. It’s major news,” the Prescription
Advantage administrator said.141
A year after the launch of Prescription Advantage, 70,000 Massachusetts seniors
had enrolled in the program, and senior advocates appeared to be pleased with its
performance, at least so far. Jessica Costantino, of AARP Massachusetts, reports that
the program is good for seniors because it is affordable; voluntary, it protects seniors
from catastrophic drug costs; and is available to everyone. “That’s what’s critical,”
Costantino said, “making sure that it is available to everyone.”142
For Betty Schmidt, a category one Prescription Advantage member, and Vice
President of the Cambridge Chapter of the Massachusetts Senior Action Council,
Prescription Advantage has been a savior. Schmidt, a 75-year-old retired waitress,
says her Blue Care 65 HMO only covers up to $600 per year in drug costs or $150
per quarter. That drug coverage does not go far enough to cover Schmidt’s $171
monthly cost for her Lipitor prescription (a drug that controls cholesterol). With
Prescription Advantage, Schmidt says she only has to pay a $12 copayment each
month for her Lipitor, as well as another $5 copayment for her Synthroid, a generic
thyroid drug.143
“If you have to have it — and the doctor told me I’d be taking it for the rest of my life
— If you have to have it, and I didn’t have the Advantage, I’d have to pay it,” Schmidt
said. “I’d probably have to give up going to the movie, or give up everything to rack up
that $171.”144
Renewed Calls for Section 271
While there seems to be a general consensus that Prescription Advantage has been
successful in enabling thousands of seniors to access drugs affordably, Section 271,
or similar bulk-purchasing initiatives, have not been ruled out. After Joe Kennedy
scaled back his efforts to convince the Commonwealth that Section 271 should be
implemented, Senator Montigny continued the fight in the Legislature. The Senate
has repeatedly inserted bulk-purchasing initiatives in the FY 2001 and 2002 state
budgets as a way to contain the costs of the Prescription Advantage Program, and
the House has accepted the plans.145 Shortly after the Prescription Advantage pro-
gram was implemented, Montigny warned Acting Governor Jane Swift and House
Speaker Tom Finneran that the Prescription Advantage plan would “fail” if it were
not integrated with a drug discount-focused initiative.146 Swift and Finneran were
reportedly skeptical of the idea, however, and Montigny was no longer receiving a
great deal of support from his colleagues in the Legislature. “There was some dis-
cussion among the members about implementing bulk-purchasing, but for the most
part, it seemed like Mark Montigny was standing out there in the wilderness,” a
Montigny aide said.147
While Prescription Advantage was providing drug coverage for seniors, Section
271, if implemented, would have provided drug coverage for the uninsured. “It was
a new way of controlling prescription drug costs,” Montigny’s aide said. The initia-
tive could have controlled costs, and provided discounts to the uninsured through a
mechanism like a drug discount card.148 One study, however, sponsored by the bio-
technology industry,149 charged that such a plan would hurt the state’s Prescription
Advantage program. The study challenged the premise that Section 271 would
actually achieve the promised discounts of 25 percent, and claimed that a Section
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271 discount card would only draw participants from the Prescription Advantage
Program.150 The study predicted that Prescription Advantage could lose up to
100,000 participants to a Section 271 discount plan, costing the program between $5
and $40 million in lost enrollments. The population most likely to be drawn to Sec-
tion 271 would be the higher-income individuals that Prescription Advantage was
relying on to remain affordable for the state.151 If this impact were realized, the
state, in turn, would be forced to hike its subsidy in order to compensate for the
losses.152 Montigny and Kennedy refuted the findings of the report, pointing out that
the study was funded by the drug industry. In a letter to the editor of the Boston
Globe, the pair wrote:
We believe that an integrated approach will allow a bulk-purchasing discount program
and Prescription Advantage to complement one another, with bulk-purchasing strength-
ening our ambitious new insurance plan.153
While Montigny has continued to push the state to aggregate drug purchases, plans
for a program aimed to protect the uninsured have been put on hold for now. In the
meantime, along with many others, Montigny is watching Joe Kennedy’s nonprofit
Citizens Health program to see how successful it is in making drugs affordable.154
Bypassing the Government:
Kennedy Launches Citizens Health
History of Citizens Energy Corporation
Joe Kennedy’s strategy for making drugs affordable for seniors and the uninsured is
a natural extension of his nonprofit Citizens Energy Corporation. A self-described
“nonprofit corporation that addresses social concerns through charitable programs
and successful commercial enterprises,” Citizens Energy has long served individuals
who are in need of basic services. Its mission statement is two-fold:
•  Develop new forms of commercial arrangements that improve the
quality of life for working families and the elderly
•  Design and manage programs to make energy, healthcare, and other
of life’s necessities more affordable and available155
Joe Kennedy founded Citizens Energy in 1979. Having graduated from the Uni-
versity of Massachusetts just a few years before, Kennedy and a few friends report-
edly conceived the idea in “the cramped basement” of his Boston home.156 The
program’s original purpose was to provide needy families with heating oil during
the oil crisis of the late 1970s.157 To get the program underway, Kennedy was able to
use personal contacts and the clout of his family name to successfully negotiate oil
prices with the Venezuelan government. Kennedy was able to persuade the Venezu-
elan government to sell oil to Citizens at prices that were below the open market
price. Sources close to the oil industry say the deal was a strong indicator of the
power of the Kennedy family, since no one else was able to negotiate such low oil
prices during that time period.158
Kennedy’s oil purchase and his method for redistributing it to the needy was very
simple. “He went out, purchased a tanker full of oil, processed it, and used the
proceeds to give the rest of it away to people of low income,” Martha Morkan of
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Citizens Health said.159 Kennedy entered into agreements with petroleum-producing
countries, “negotiated finance, shipping and refining deals and sold off the refined
petroleum products.”160 Through storage agreements with major terminal operators
and contracts with hundreds of oil retailers, Kennedy was able to provide heating oil
to the poor at discounts up to 40 percent. When Kennedy’s first tanker full of heat-
ing oil from Venezuela arrived in Boston Harbor, it did so with great fanfare, gener-
ating much publicity for the new nonprofit corporation.161 The oil was distributed
not only to poor elders, but to working families in the Boston area.162
Under the leadership of Joseph Kennedy, and eventually his brother, Michael
Kennedy163 while Joe served in Congress for twelve years, Citizens Energy ex-
panded dramatically as it discovered new ways to meet very basic needs for low-
income individuals. In addition to expanding fuel assistance to thousands of families
in Massachusetts, Citizens was also very active in both nonprofit and for-profit ini-
tiatives such as oil exploration, pharmaceutical distribution, and gas and electricity
trading.164 Known for its commitment to re-investing in social programs in the na-
tions Citizens does business with,165 Citizens touts accomplishments including: the
introduction of hybrid seeds to Nigerian farms to increase farm outputs and raise
nutrition levels; channeling loans to poor people in Ecuador, Colombia, and South
Africa, enabling them to start their own businesses; the introduction of biomass
technology in Costa Rica, bringing electricity to rural communities; the introduction
of solar energy to hospitals in Jamaica and Venezuela; and the creation of Angola’s
first private university, the Catholic University of Angola.166 Locally, Citizens
launched a number of other public service initiatives including conservation pro-
grams, public health initiatives, and healthcare for the homeless programs.167
The Citizens program that may have best positioned Kennedy for the eventual
launch of Citizens Health was the mail-order prescription drug program that was the
direct result of a valuable partnership between Citizens Energy and the Medco Cor-
poration. In the early 1980s, Joe Kennedy realized that rising drug costs were be-
coming a problem for low-income people. “What he found was that the cost of the
middle-man was really inflating the price of drugs,” Morkan says.168 Citizens
partnered with Medco containment services, a pharmacy benefit manager that of-
fered drugs to businesses at low prices, in part, by using mail-order services. The
result was a mail-service pharmacy called Citizens Medco, based on Kennedy’s idea
that he could save people money on their drug costs by taking the pharmacist out of
the equation.169 In the Citizens Medco partnership, Citizens primarily served as the
marketing arm for Medco, recruiting clients for the company including many na-
tional unions, the Nynex company, and Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts.170
The joint venture proved to be very profitable for Citizens, but it was also very
effective in saving people 40 percent off the costs of their drugs. To serve the
needy, Citizens pitched the mail-service program to church plans, employee con-
tracts, and other organizations that would reach working families.171
The Citizens Medco program was, in large part, overseen and developed by
Michael Kennedy, while Joe Kennedy served in Congress from 1986 through 1998.
While working on Capitol Hill, Kennedy immersed himself in issues that would
directly address social needs, looking for novel private sector approaches that would
help communities to achieve economic growth and prosperity.172 Among other ini-
tiatives, Kennedy pushed legislation that included fair-lending reforms that would
help working people buy homes and start businesses, created affordable housing
units by using tax credits to encourage private investment in public housing, and
preserved and expanded federal research and development accounts that stimulate
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new jobs and business growth.173 These initiatives helped Kennedy to develop an
agenda in Washington that proved to be consistent with the values on which he had
built Citizens Energy.
When Joe Kennedy returned to manage Citizens Energy full time in 1998 after
his brother was killed in a tragic ski accident, his experience in Washington told him
that prescription drug costs were becoming a huge problem for low- to moderate-
income individuals. It also became apparent that the mail service that he had helped
implement fifteen years earlier just wasn’t solving it.174
Citizens Health is Launched in Fall 2001
After two years of haggling with state lawmakers to implement his bulk-purchasing
initiative, Kennedy remained committed to “doing it another way.”175 “It was clear
that the state just didn’t want to move forward,” Joe Kennedy told the Boston Globe.
“The state had an opportunity to save itself tens of millions of dollars a year. You
can bring a horse to water, but you can’t make him drink.”176 Perhaps the years of
wrangling with state leaders provided even more motivation for launching the bulk-
purchasing plan as a nonprofit initiative. “We were frustrated,” Martha Morkan says.
“He had stepped out there into the issue, and he felt like he had to do something.” 177
Though the premise for the Citizens Health program had been well developed for
the push for Section 271, the Citizens Energy staff had a lot of work to do to make
the idea operational. New staff were hired to concentrate on the new project; thus it
took more than a year to get off the ground. In the summer of 2000, Citizens put
out a request for information (RFI) for a PBM. Though Citizens received a lot of
responses, Express Scripts was awarded the contract because of its standing as the
largest PBM in the country and its proposal to offer to Citizens some money to help
pay for the development of the new program.178 While Express Scripts was largely
responsible for recruiting the network of pharmacies for participation in Citizens
Health, Kennedy himself was responsible for forming important partnerships with
two pharmaceutical manufacturers: GlaxoSmithKline and Bristol-Myers Squibb. The
two companies agreed to provide deeper discounts to Citizens Health members who
purchased prescription drugs that they manufacture.179
The key to getting Citizens Health off the ground resided in its marketing and
community outreach efforts. Citizens developed a “two-prong approach” to create
awareness of the new program — a “community-based outreach supported by a mass
marketing campaign.”180 The strategy relied heavily on the proven qualities of Citi-
zens Energy Corporation:
•  trust and credibility with working families and seniors;
•  the influence and name recognition of Congressman Joseph P. Kennedy
II as an advocate for vulnerable populations; and
•  a highly targeted distribution network of community-based organiza-
tions.181
Community outreach efforts, and efforts to form partnerships with pharmaceutical
companies were complicated because Citizens Health, prior to its launch, did not
have an existing base of potential members. Unlike the state, which, had it imple-
mented a Section 271 discount card, already would have had its pool of members in
place if it headed to the bargaining table, Citizens Health didn’t have that base. To
bring pharmaceutical companies on board so that the program could offer deeper
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discounts on some brand-name drugs, Citizens had to win the trust of those compa-
nies by promising that the discount would be worth their while because Citizens was
going, one day, to have a lot of members, which would, in turn, increase the compa-
nies’ market share. Citizens faced a similar challenge when it tried to partner with
community organizations: “We went to the community organizations and said, ‘if
you get on board with us, then we’re going to have more leverage with the pharma-
ceutical manufacturers and the pharmacy benefit managers,’” Morkan says.182 Ulti-
mately, Citizens realized, it would just have to launch the program, recognizing that
as more people signed up, the discounts would grow.183
Though Citizens Energy designed Citizens Health so that it might eventually be
applicable nationwide, its leaders felt that it was best to start small so that the corpo-
ration could experiment, on a much smaller scale, with community outreach strate-
gies, marketing, and customer service. The plan was initially launched, then, to
serve individuals in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island.184 The target
population, Morkan says, was Medicare beneficiaries who didn’t have drug coverage
and hadn’t figured out some other way to get drug coverage. In Massachusetts, that
would mean the segment of the population not enrolled in Prescription Advantage.
The discount card would cost participants $12 annually for an individual member-
ship and $28 annually for a family membership. The plan would offer discounts that
would average about 40 percent,185 with deeper discounts realized on GlaxoSmith-
Kline and Bristol-Myers Squibb manufactured drugs. Cardholders could get their
discounts at about a thousand pharmacies in the three states.
Citizens Health was due to launch in September 2001, and according to one
Boston Herald columnist, it was going to be unveiled to the public during the week
of September 11.186 Due to the tragic events surrounding the terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon that day, the launch was delayed until later
that month. Kennedy kicked off the program with various press events scattered
throughout the three states where the program was being offered.187 In general, state
lawmakers offered their support to Kennedy’s program. Senator Richard Moore,
chair of the Legislature’s Health Care Committee, praised the program as “another
important option for many people across the state.”188 Senator Montigny, Kennedy’s
Section 271 ally, was not caught off guard by the launch of Citizens Health. “He
was not surprised,” Tom Dehner said. “They did not spring it on us.”189 By October
2001, Citizens Health was up and running, aiming to make drugs affordable for
people in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island.
Program Mechanics
Eligibility. Unlike Prescription Advantage, which is designed to help senior citizens
and the low-income disabled population, there are no restrictions on who can enroll
in the Citizens Health program. While the plan was designed to help the “gap” popu-
lation who are not eligible for Medicaid but still cannot afford health insurance,
anyone can apply to enroll in Citizens Health.190 In fact, Citizens Health does not
require applicants to disclose their income level on the application for the program.
Morkan says that the decision was made to exclude that requirement because Citi-
zens didn’t want people who were filling out the applications to think that the pro-
gram would only be available to them if they fell into a certain income category.191
Enrollment. Participants can enroll in Citizens Health by applying for membership
online on the Citizens website, through the mail, or over the telephone. Online
enrollment, which offers secure credit-card processing, is the quickest and easiest
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method if Internet access is available. The mail option may take a bit longer, but it
allows members to pay the enrollment fee via credit card, personal check, or money
order.192 Telephone enrollments are also a quick way to apply for membership, if the
participant can pay the enrollment fee via credit card.
In addition to relying on public-service announcements and billboards that publi-
cize the Citizens Health hotline (1-800-JOE-K-4RX), Citizens relies heavily on its
partnerships with community-based organizations to facilitate enrollment.193 To
enhance these partnerships, Citizens remains in constant contact with its community
partners by sending them weekly emails, brochures, and other literature to get their
attention. “In most cases, what people have told us is that they see us as another tool
in their toolbox,” Morkan says, pointing out that Citizens Health has made life easier
for social workers in these agencies who previously may have had to tell people who
may not be eligible for Medicaid but can’t afford insurance that there was nothing
they can do to help them. “We have had great success with those people who say
‘thank God there’s something that I can offer them.’”194
Achieving Discounts. In order to purchase drugs at the discounted rates that Citizens
Health has negotiated, cardholders must purchase their drugs at one of the approxi-
mately one thousand pharmacies in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island
that have signed on with the plan. National chains that have participating outlets in
any of the three states will also honor the discount at their locations in other states.195
The Citizens pharmacy network includes a number of major retailers including
Brooks Pharmacy, Stop & Shop, Shaws, Star, Costco, Target, and several indepen-
dent pharmacies.196
The discounts that Express Scripts has negotiated with the Citizens pharmacy
network are applicable to all drug purchases. Discounts are realized immediately at
the point of purchase, enabling members to save approximately 35 to 50 percent off
the price of generic drugs and 12 to 25 percent off the price of brand name drugs.197
Citizens Health members may also reap “EXTRA Savings” on a list of approxi-
mately sixty drugs manufactured by GlaxoSmithKline, Bristol-Myers Squibb, and
Eli Lilly198 owing to the direct negotiating that Joe Kennedy has done with those
companies. Members may also increase their discounts by using the Citizens Health
mail-order service, a service that Morkan says is not heavily used. The call center,
which is administered by Express Scripts, encourages members to use the mail ser-
vice because the extra savings on brand name drugs are significant, but, for reasons
that program administrators have not identified, people are hesitant to use it.199
Medical Information & Education. In addition to the drug discounts that Citizens
offers its members, the company also touts its commitment to educating its members
about the drugs they buy as well as its ability to track drug purchases to ensure that
patients are using their drugs safely. Membership in Citizens Health provides partici-
pants with access to a 24-hour toll-free call-line through which they can ask pharma-
cists specific questions about the drugs they are taking or other related medical
conditions.200 In addition, Citizens Health also functions as a manager of pharmaceu-
tical purchases, effectively tracking the drugs that its members purchase, flagging
potential drug interactions even if the patient makes purchases at multiple pharma-
cies. This particular feature is especially important for seniors who may be visiting a
number of doctors who are prescribing a number of different drugs. “If you’re tak-
ing six drugs, there’s a 100 percent chance that there are going to be interactions,”
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Morkan says. By entering a member’s drug purchases into one central computer, a
pharmacist would be prompted to ask questions or provide the proper advice to a
patient who may experience the effects of a potential drug interaction.201
Negotiating Discounts
The success of Citizens Health is largely determined by its ability to negotiate dis-
counted drug prices for its members. While Express Scripts has been successful in
achieving discounts with the pharmacies that have signed on to the program,
Citizens has found that it can be more effective in extracting discounts from drug
manufacturers by negotiating with them directly. Joe Kennedy and his staff were
successful in getting GlaxoSmithKline and Bristol-Myers Squibb to offer deeper
discounts before the program was launched.202 Morkan says the Citizens pitch was:
“This is a population that doesn’t purchase prescription drugs because they don’t
have insurance, and we could actually increase their market share, if these people
could afford their drugs.”203 During the planning phase, it was difficult to attract
more manufacturers to participate in the program because Citizens did not have an
existing customer base yet.  Once the plan got underway in October, Morkan says,
“other drug companies started calling us back, saying ‘let’s talk about this.’ ”204 Eli
Lilly has since formed a partnership with Citizens, and many others are looking at
joining the program as well.
In its ongoing talks with various pharmaceutical manufacturers, Citizens is find-
ing that it may have to change the way in which it offers discounts to its members in
order to get more companies to participate. What Citizens has learned is that the
pharmaceutical companies are willing to negotiate deeper discounts if they can be
targeted specifically to lower income individuals — members who are under 300
percent of FPL, and promising even deeper discounts to members who are under
200 percent of FPL.205 “We got far to a certain point, [getting] three companies to
sign on for giving discounts to everybody — but they are willing to give greater
discounts to the poor,” Pat Norton, Director of Business Development for Citizens
Health, said.206 While Citizens Health has, in large part, ignored the income levels of
its participants, inviting everyone to join, they will begin tracking income so that the
program will be able to offer more relief to people with low incomes. While every-
one will still be eligible to join the program, members who are low income will
have access to greater discounts. In fact, Citizens said GlaxoSmithKline and Eli
Lilly would be offering extra discounts for low-income seniors by May 2002.207
Partnerships with Pharmaceutical Companies
This is an opportunity to provide some leadership in the industry and reinforce the mes-
sage it is important for a Medicare reform bill to pass that has a prescription drug benefit
included.208
—Nancy Pekarek, spokesperson for GlaxoSmithKline
Despite their strong opposition to bulk-purchasing initiatives proposed at the
government level, pharmaceutical companies are forming partnerships with Citizens
Health, and providing drugs to its members at discounted rates. Why the change of
heart? Although Citizens Health has enabled them, to some extent, to increase their
market share, the main reason why they have likely agreed to work with Citizens
Health is, Morkan says, because “they’re beginning to recognize that that they need
to start being a part of the solution” to the problem, which is that many Americans
cannot afford drugs. If pharmaceutical companies are voluntarily providing some
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relief for those individuals, then maybe the government won’t hit them with price
controls.209 The drug industry source agrees:
I think the companies will do a lot of things to forestall that from happening, whether it’s
more philanthropy, support of government programs, or a variety of creative things to
deal with the genuine problem, but without going so far to destroy the industry or
weaken it irreparably.210
Grassroots Outreach
While Express Scripts’ success in signing on a number of pharmacies to the Citizens
Health plan has been key to its ability to get underway, more important, Morkan
says, are the partnerships that Citizens has formed with several independent pharma-
cies. “The population that we’re trying to serve, and the way that we’re trying to
serve them, [through] grassroots outreach, is really best-served through independent
pharmacies.” Independent pharmacies, Morkan says, which typically form more
personal relationships with their customers, are more likely to be able to offer the
card to someone who may need it. “They recognize the people they serve who don’t
have insurance.”211
In addition to forming relationships with the pharmacies, Citizens continues to
knock on the doors of various community groups who may help them identify indi-
viduals who could benefit significantly from enrollment in the Citizens Health pro-
gram. Citizens Health has developed relationships with senior centers, community
health centers, and councils on aging throughout the three states that it currently
serves. Morkan says that the outreach can be slow and tedious, as her staff members
essentially go door-to-door to community meetings and events, but it is crucial to
reaching the people whom Citizens Health is trying to help. “The majority of people
don’t look for services, they’re not out there looking for help. Finding a way to get
to them is our struggle right now, from a cost-effective perspective.”212
The ironic aspect of Citizens Health’s outreach efforts in Massachusetts is that
they often result in the recruitment of members for the Prescription Advantage pro-
gram. “We’re not out there telling people what they should do,” Morkan says.
“We’re giving you options, and that’s what this is about.”213 As part of that education
process, Morkan says her outreach staff will tell people that insurance is better if
people can afford it. In Massachusetts, that mantra will often drive people toward
Prescription Advantage. Since Citizens Health has targeted its outreach to low-in-
come elders, that education process has actually raised concerns for Prescription
Advantage administrators, according to Morkan:
The state had some real concerns that we were going to increase their numbers once we
started doing our outreach. We know that we have. When we find lower income people,
we say to them “you’re crazy to buy our card, because the state will give you this benefit
for next to nothing.”…But from the state’s perspective, they’re not looking for that
group anymore, they’re looking for healthier, higher income people, and those are the
people who are more likely to buy a discount card.214
Citizens Health Report Card
Approximately six months after the launch of Citizens Health, administrators were
pleased with the extent to which they had helped people get drugs affordably. As of
March 2002, fifteen thousand people had enrolled in the program. “That’s a good
strong number for what we’ve been doing for six months, for the discounts we’ve
been able to offer so far,” Morkan says. “Once we can offer some deeper discounts,
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that will change dramatically.” She says that Citizens had not made any enrollment
projections with which they can compare outcomes, but Morkan says that Joe
Kennedy is aiming to enroll one hundred thousand members in the program.215 In
terms of discounts being realized by members, though they vary by individual drug
needs, discounts are averaging 40 percent for members, which is what the program
had advertised when it launched.216
The rollout of Citizens Health has helped the program’s administrators to better
define both who their target audience is and what may be the best way to reach
them. In Massachusetts, for example, the Citizens Health population has turned out
to be moderate- to middle-income seniors, and uninsured individuals under age
sixty-five who are not in Medicaid.217 Morkan says their original outreach strategy,
which was heavily reliant on relationships with community health centers, may not
be the best way to reach that population. “We’ve got to figure out where’s the best
place for us to be, where we can reach people. We thought it was going to be com-
munity health centers and CAP agencies that were the place to go, but we’ve learned
they’re a little too low-income for us.” The majority of the population served by
community health centers is either signed up with Medicaid or other free care pro-
grams.218
One strategy that Citizens is exploring to reach out to the under 65 population is
forming relationships with corporations. Morkan says Citizens has been talking with
corporations in the services, retail, and manufacturing industries, which employ a
number of part-time workers who may not qualify for health insurance benefits. In
some cases, even if employees do qualify, the health benefits offered by these com-
panies are so expensive that workers would have to contribute their entire part-time
paychecks to enroll in them. To tap into this market, Citizens has been talking to
various employers about either buying Citizens cards for their employees or allow-
ing Citizens to advertise the card on the company premises via posters, handouts,
and applications.219
How Citizens Compares with Other Discount Plans
Citizens Health is certainly not the first discount drug plan to hit the market. PBMs,
insurance companies, retail stores, associations, and nonprofit organizations have
long offered similar programs. Recently, some states and even drug manufacturers
have jumped on the discount card bandwagon.220 AARP has offered a discount card
for its members for ten years.221
Citizens Health says it scores very well on five criteria identified in a February
2002 report on discount drug plans released by the Kaiser Family Foundation for
measuring a program’s value: number/type of medications available, convenience
and accessibility, mail-order services, professional pharmacist consulting, and dis-
counts realized by members.222 In terms of the number/type of medications avail-
able, Morkan points out that all drugs are discounted under the Citizens Health plan,
both generic and brand name. Morkan would also give Citizens a relatively high
mark for convenience and accessibility because of its relationship with approxi-
mately one thousand retail locations. Until the plan successfully convinces large
chains including CVS, Rite Aid, and Walgreens to sign on to the program, Morkan
says, there is clearly room for improvement in this area. Citizens does offer mail
service, and Express Scripts pushes it at the call center when it is apparent that a
customer could achieve greater savings by going that route, but few people tend to
use it. The exact opposite is true, however, for Citizens’ professional pharmacist
consulting option. Morkan says the Citizens Health 24-hour toll-free hotline is
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heavily used. “I’m guessing it’s because this is a population that — especially the
under 65 — doesn’t have primary care physicians, and they are using the pharma-
cist more as their physician,” Morkan says.223
Kaiser’s last criteria —“discounts realized by members” is the area where Citi-
zens feels it most stands out from the pack. While it is not unusual for a discount
card program to cover all drugs, Citizens may be the only plan out there that’s
actually negotiating deeper savings for consumers. “It sent lots of waves through
the industry when Joe started doing that.” In addition, if other plans do get rebates
from specific manufacturers (as they likely are, Morkan says), they are not neces-
sarily passing them on in full to consumers, Morkan says.224 All of what Citizens
Health terms “prebates,” or the discounts that Citizens negotiates, are passed along
in their entirety to consumers. Unlike some plans, Morkan says, Citizens does not
steer customers to certain drugs so that Citizens will get greater discounts from the
manufacturers. Citizens Health is now offering more than sixty drugs that every-
one, no matter what income level, can receive extra savings on. The discount is
calculated right at the register, so consumers only see the lower price. “We’re gain-
ing on this extra savings thing, and the others don’t seem to be looking to change at
all,” Morkan says.225
Citizens Health points out that it is just getting started, too, in terms of the dis-
counts that it is offering to members. “What we have right now, and it’s probably
the best thing out there, it is middle class,” Pat Norton says.226 As Citizens continues
to explore opportunities where manufacturers are willing to negotiate deeper dis-
counts for lower-income members, their card will be even better. “Once we get
these other pieces of it, we’re by far the best card. Right now, we’re competitive,”
Norton says. “This is what we call an incremental product development.”227 Martha
Morkan agrees: “Once we can operationalize deeper discounts for [members] under
65, that will just totally change who we are, and what we are in this market.”228
Weighing in on Citizens Health
While few would argue that any initiative that aims to save money on drugs for the
poor is an unworthy undertaking, many healthcare experts point out that the sav-
ings it achieves for people are essentially a drop in the bucket in terms of what is
needed to make a difference for people who are looking for a way to access drugs
affordably. “Making drugs cheaper doesn’t go far enough,” says Dr. Stephen
Soumerai, director of drug policy research at Harvard Medical School. “It doesn’t
reduce out-of-pocket expenses . . . enough to make drugs cheap enough to ensure
access for lower-income people.”229 Doctor Alan Sager of the Boston University
School of Public Health echoes Soumerai’s sentiment: “The cards are not a big
benefit. They’re like trying to stop the tank of skyrocketing drug spending with a
peashooter.”230
In Senator Montigny’s office, staffers are supportive of Kennedy’s initiative, but
agree that it is limited in terms of the kind of impact it can have. “The discounts
aren’t big enough, even Joe Kennedy doesn’t have enough power,” Tom Dehner
says.231 At Prescription Advantage, where many calls from confused consumers
were misdirected when Citizens Health first rolled out its discount plan, a key ad-
ministrator pointed out that the discounts were limited. For example, he said, if a
patient takes the drug Zocor, a $95 drug per month for high cholesterol, he’s still
going to pay $65 to $75 for it with a Citizens discount.
One of the things we heard after three months of the card’s rollout… people felt misin-
formed, or very deceived, because what they thought was going to be a major discount
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at the pharmacy, wasn’t. That’s the problem with marketing this type of card. They’re
not going to get you huge discounts.232
The administrators at Citizens Health fully acknowledge the limitations of a dis-
count card, and in their outreach efforts will recommend that individuals seek out
insurance coverage if they have high drug use. Citizens’ goal has been to give people
who don’t have insurance a means of lowering their drug costs and, as the program
moves forward, its administrators say they will remain committed to seeking deeper
discounts for members. As Martha Morkan points out — there’s a great deal at stake
for Citizens if it fails to do so:
People’s Prescription Plan or Merck-Medco can go out there with their discount cards
. . . people have an expectation that’s really low. They control their expectation because it
is a for-profit discount card. But, when Joe Kennedy goes out there, and it’s a nonprofit
discount card, and Joe’s face is on everything, and the phone number is JOE-K-4RX,
it’s a very personal thing.233
Outlook for the Future
Citizens Health is focused on seeking out ways to negotiate deeper discounts and
making drugs affordable for the people it serves in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and
Rhode Island. It is no secret, however, that in its current form, Citizens Health is
essentially a pilot initiative for a program that Kennedy plans to expand on a na-
tional level.234 For that reason, the lessons that administrators are learning about the
population that Citizens can best serve, and the strategies it should employ to do
outreach for the program, are extremely valuable as Kennedy prepares for a national
rollout. In fact, Citizens is eyeing September 2002 as a target date for taking their
program national.235
Right now, in March of 2002, while administrators are testing the model,236
Morkan is closely evaluating the strategies they use for community outreach, and is
trying to better define the population Citizens serves. In addition to broadening its
outreach to corporations that may sell the card or at least educate their uninsured
employees about the card, Citizens Health is also experimenting with selling prepaid
Citizens Health cards to pharmacies and convenience stores. The concept is similar
to that of the prepaid calling card. The customer can pay the $12 enrollment fee
right at the register, and then call in and activate the card via a unique pin number.237
In terms of product development, Citizens is continuing its efforts to negotiate
discounts with manufacturers, and is seeking out even deeper discounts for low-
income individuals. In addition, Citizens Health is broadening its discount plan to
include vision care. The optical departments at Target, Sears, and Pearle Vision
locations will be among the retailers that will allow members to access discounted
prices with their Citizens Health cards. “This is big, because it is different than
drugs,” Morkan says.238
A Government Model?
It is no coincidence that President Bush is currently pushing a Medicare-sponsored
drug discount plan that is fundamentally built on the premise underlying Section
271, and now, Citizens Health. A few years ago, when Joe Kennedy was encourag-
ing Massachusetts leaders to adopt his bulk-purchasing initiative, he was also send-
ing letters to the governors of the forty-nine other states in the United States,
encouraging them to do the same thing. At that time, George W. Bush was Governor
of Texas and now-Health & Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson was
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Governor of Wisconsin. “Some of the actions that the Bush administration is taking
now with Medicare Rx are direct results of the conversations that Joe had with them
when they were governors,” Morkan says. The Bush administration continues to
consult Citizens Health on this particular issue, as he continues to push for a Medi-
care discount plan.239
The drug industry source raises the point that Kennedy may have moved forward
with Citizens Health because he was interested in positioning himself for a role in
the proposed Medicare drug program. Many of the bills circulating on Capitol Hill
call for the Medicare benefit to be administered region-by-region, making Kennedy
a perfect candidate for managing the benefit for the New England region:
If Congress does pass a Medicare prescription drug benefit, it will be companies like
Express Scripts that may be running it. He could be a person that would help run the
Medicare benefit, with millions and millions of seniors, which would be an enormous
financial opportunity.240
While Martha Morkan says that the experience of building Citizens Health could
definitely make the nonprofit an ideal candidate to play the role of “aggregator” for
purchasing the drugs for a Medicare benefit, she is skeptical that the result would be
the same. “The thing that I can’t get my arms around is the fact that the industry
won’t play with [the government] the same way, can’t play with them the same
way,” Morkan says.241 When the industry negotiates with Citizens Health, she points
out, they know they’re not facing the power of the government.
We don’t have price controls in our back pocket, and the government does. It would
have been like pulling teeth to get them to come to the table if we were the government.
The fact that we weren’t, but that we had the credibility of Joe Kennedy, that’s what got
them to the table.242
Analysis of the Findings
Drugs Cost Too Much, Even for the Government
At the crux of the prescription drug crisis and the government’s challenge in unrav-
eling it lies the reality that prescription drug costs are climbing to levels that are
unaffordable, not only for the uninsured, but for HMOs, Medicare-plus plans, state
Medicaid programs, and even the federal government. In the private sector, insur-
ance coverage is slipping as prescription drug costs grow to levels that insurance
companies simply can’t absorb without hiking the costs of their benefit plans. As a
result, employers are forced to cut back on the benefits they provide to their existing
employees and their retirees, and in many cases even drop prescription coverage
altogether from the plans that they offer. The fallout from this chain of events is that
more and more people are looking to the federal and state government to protect
them from the lack of drug coverage and the rising prices, either through subsidies
or by developing and implementing a strategy that would lower actual costs. For
seniors and their advocates, the most obvious solution would be the addition of a
prescription drug benefit to Medicare. But Congress and the Bush administration
have yet to construct a plan that would make such an option affordable. While law-
makers on Capitol Hill continue to drag their feet on this issue, states are doing the
right thing by implementing programs that will relieve some of the burden facing
their seniors, but for the most part, these plans are only stopgap measures.
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Prescription Advantage Provides the Coverage that Medicare Should
In Massachusetts, the implementation of the Prescription Advantage program is
revolutionary. It is a plan that aims to provide prescription drug coverage not only
for low-income elders, but for senior citizens who have higher incomes, who,
depending on their healthcare needs, may also be vulnerable to skyrocketing drug
costs. It frees seniors from the anxiety surrounding the possibility that suddenly they
could be struck with a catastrophic illness that would bring drug costs that they
simply could not afford to bear. Most important, it is an insurance model, not an
entitlement program that — despite warnings from senior advocates, government
watchdog groups, and fiscal conservatives — has remained affordable for the state
in its first year of operation. From a fiscal perspective, the outlook may grow more
positive as the program continues to step up its efforts to recruit healthier, higher-
income seniors who will pay more into the program, further offsetting the costs of
the low-income elders who now constitute 80 percent of the membership.
Even the key administrator interviewed for this case study admits, however, that
if Medicare ever implements a prescription drug benefit, the need for Prescription
Advantage would disappear. Prescription Advantage, though it has captured a small
discount on drugs by offering a three-tier formulary through its PBM, has done very
little in reducing the actual prices paid to drug companies. If drug prices continue to
rise at double-digit rates243 as they have in the past decade, Prescription Advantage
will grow more and more expensive for the state, and possibly for plan members,
who may be charged higher premiums and co-payments. Although there is still talk
among lawmakers about aggregating the state’s drug purchases, the pharmaceutical
and biotechnology industries have done an excellent job of convincing lawmakers
that to save money through bulk-purchasing, they would have to restrict the number
of drugs that are offered. These assertions have put patient advocate groups on the
alert, and they are likely ready to flood lawmakers with letters that will oppose any
kind of bulk-purchasing proposal.
Citizens Health: Serving a Different Population
Joe Kennedy’s Citizens Health program is doing exactly what he had set out to do
through Section 271, but on a much smaller scale. He is squeezing savings out of the
drug companies that are willing to negotiate with him and passing on those discounts
directly to consumers enrolled in the plan. Once he can segment his membership
into age and income categories, Kennedy will make drugs even more affordable for
those who have the greatest need for assistance. If he succeeds in taking his plan
national, and reaches his goal of 100,000 members or more, he will have a greater
impact on the pharmaceutical industry, and may succeed in effectively bringing
down the costs of drugs, at least to some extent, on a national scale.
Unlike Prescription Advantage, Citizens Health will still maintain a niche in the
market if and when the federal government passes a Medicare prescription drug
benefit. According to Martha Morkan, Citizens is finding that it can serve a much
broader population than even the program’s organizers originally had thought.
While the most obvious population to be served had been elders because they fill the
most prescriptions, clearly today’s drug prices have put drugs out of reach for unin-
sured individuals under sixty-five as well. By not requiring members to fall into
specific age or income categories, Citizens Health has attracted a wide range of indi-
viduals to its plan. Citizens has been very innovative in its strategies to seek out
members by forming partnerships with corporations, and by selling cards at the
registers of convenience stores, similar to pre-paid phone cards. With national data
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indicating that one in four, or 70 million, Americans do not have insurance that
includes prescription drug coverage,244 there is certainly a large group of people,
who are not elders, who likely would not be any better off if Medicare eventually
includes a prescription drug benefit. For those folks, a program like Citizens Health
is a practical option.
Discount Card Not the Answer for Medicare
While Citizens Health is a worthwhile program that can effectively make drugs
affordable for thousands of people in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island,
and eventually the United States, it should not serve as a model for a Medicare drug
benefit. All of the individuals who were interviewed for this case study agree that
Medicare beneficiaries need drug coverage, not a discount. For Betty Schmidt, who
would face a monthly bill of $171 for Lipitor if she were not enrolled in Prescrip-
tion Advantage, a 40 to 50 percent discount would still put her drug bill at around
$100 a month, which is too much for a low-income senior citizen to spend. If Betty
were ever struck with a catastrophic illness that were to suddenly drive her drug
costs even higher, she would find herself having to make the tough decisions that Joe
Kennedy often talks about, between heating oil, food on the table, or the drugs she
needs to stay alive.
As this case study points out, Martha Morkan is not sure the government could
even implement a discount program like Citizens Health, because drug companies
would likely be more hesitant to negotiate significant discounts with the govern-
ment. Right now, the companies that work with Citizens Health do so voluntarily,
knowing that if they don’t want to negotiate, they don’t have to. Joe Kennedy, as
powerful as his family name is, cannot directly penalize them for not participating.
The government, though the powerful prescription drug lobby will likely persuade it
not to, could slap the industry with price controls if it wanted to penalize drug com-
panies for not coming to the bargaining table.
Concluding Thoughts
While Prescription Advantage is essentially a temporary solution for Medicare’s lack
of drug coverage and is doing very little to bring down drug prices, it is effectively
helping seniors meet their prescription drug needs in Massachusetts. State lawmak-
ers, however, should re-visit the idea of aggregating drug purchases — not to pro-
vide a discount card — but to lower the costs of drug purchases for Prescription
Advantage, Medicaid, and state employees. By lowering its drug costs, the state
could ensure that it would be able to maintain an adequate level of assistance for
those who need it most. Nobody, at least not publicly, has conducted an in-depth,
nonpartisan study that has specifically itemized the costs or potential savings of such
a proposal. Nor has anyone provided a detailed plan for implementing a bulk-
purchasing initiative for the state. If lawmakers could determine exactly how the
plan would work and prove that it would yield significant savings, they would have
little choice other than to endorse the measure. In the meantime, Prescription Ad-
vantage can serve as a model for policymakers on the national level, who should
move forward with a comprehensive prescription drug benefit for Medicare benefi-
ciaries. Prescription Advantage administrators would be a valuable resource for
information and advice on tracking drug use, cutting costs through a three-tier
formulary, and providing customer service and enrollment procedures for a potential
Medicare drug benefit.
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Policymakers could learn a great deal from Citizens Health in terms of customer
service and outreach through a strong grassroots network. There are many lessons to
be learned from Citizens Health’s innovative approaches to seeking out the people
who could benefit from a prescription drug assistance program, but who may not be
actively looking for help. If the government could take a similar approach, it could
help more people get the drugs they need, and fewer would be skipping doses or not
filling prescriptions in order to avoid paying high prices. By encouraging people to
keep up with their prescribed drug therapies, as their doctors have recommended,
the government could prevent the increased healthcare costs that will come after an
individual’s condition has worsened.
Citizens Health could also provide valuable insight into negotiation strategies
with prescription drug companies — which will be crucial to implementing a Medi-
care prescription drug benefit that the government will be able to afford. Expanding
Medicare to include a prescription drug benefit simply will not go far enough. To
implement an effective program that will remain viable, the government is going to
have to take the pharmaceutical industry head-on. Leaders need to convince drug-
makers to work with them on this issue in order to determine just how far they can
go in cutting drug prices without hurting the industry’s ability to conduct important
research and development.
Prescription drugs, which must be subject to a very safe and thorough develop-
ment process, are always going to come at a cost. The real question, then, is how
that cost can be distributed fairly between the drug companies, the government, the
health insurance industry, the pharmacies, and the individual. The federal govern-
ment must find a way to strike that balance. If it fails to do so, drug costs will con-
tinue to climb to unimaginable levels, and a Medicare prescription drug benefit will
be far too costly for the government to maintain. While programs like Citizens
Health are helpful in enabling people to access drugs affordably for now, they are
not the answer to the broader problem.z
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